Friday 25 September 2015

Definitions of Consent and Rape


In this post I am going to analyze how Adrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon both seem to view and represent ‘consent' in the context of rape. I find their understandings a bit confusing, and it makes me wonder how conversations around consent have changed from the second wave of feminism to today.

Dworkin’s speech is interesting because even though she is addressing the issue of rape I don’t think she ever clearly defines what it is. She acknowledges that rape happens, “because of the kind of power that men have over women” and that this “power is institutionalized.” However, she does not give a concrete description of what the act is. Her descriptions of rape do use words that evoke violence (like hitting and hurting, etc…) and violation (like ‘you can buy and sell women’ and they are there to ‘provide you what you need’). One of the issues that I have with this is that it seems to be focusing on one kind of rape, and that is our typical image of the violent rape that happens in the streets. Dworkin is addressing an audience of men and while she is asking them to stop raping women, she is not telling them how to do this. Furthermore, when she talks about practicing equality in the home she is not addressing the issues of consent and sexual autonomy within intimate relationships. I think this is a huge problem

Conversely, MacKinnon’s writing defines rape in a more succinct way. MacKinnon says that legally the “rape crime centers around penetration,” and uses words like, “forcible violation” to describe the act. In class we discussed how in MacKinnon’s text she claims that heterosexual sex is in always some form rape because heterosexuality focuses on the “eroticization of dominance,” in men and submission in women. This means that in some way there is always force involved and gender inequality is always present. Since these factors are always in play, MacKinnon deconstructs whether or not “consent is a meaningful concept.” This article begs the question of whether or not a woman can consent to sex with a man if she has internalized the systemic forms of oppression that make force and coercion an inherent part of heterosexual sex.

This language of consent makes me wonder about how we define consent in contemporary terms. While Dworkin’s speech did not address consent almost at all, MacKinnon’s made consent sound unattainable. While I agree that consent is an integral part in defining what is rape and what isn’t, I can see how existing power structures can negate consent, especially in intimate relationships. I suppose I am arguing that the focus on consent as the only defining feature of rape seems to ignore the gender inequality in place, but at the same time MacKinnon’s definition of rape is so extreme. I wonder if there is a balance between the two definitions that might be more useful in helping to define coercion in the case of power structures.

*I did not have page numbers in my readings so I couldn't use them in my citations. I'm sorry!

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